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ABSTRACT  
With Hegel’s metaphysics attracting renewed attention, it is time to address a long-
standing criticism: Scholars from Marx to Popper and Habermas have worried that 
Hegel’s metaphysics has anti-individualist and authoritarian implications, which are 
particularly pronounced in his Philosophy of History, since Hegel identifies historical 
progress with reason imposing itself on individuals. Rather than proposing an alternative 
non-metaphysical conception of reason, as Pippin or Brandom have done, this article 
argues that critics are broadly right in their metaphysical reading of Hegel’s central 
concepts. However, they are mistaken about what Hegel’s approach entails, when one 
examines the specific types of states discussed (and rejected) by the philosopher in his 
Philosophy of History. Even on a traditional metaphysical reading, Hegel is not only non-
authoritarian; he also makes a powerful argument concerning freedom, whereupon the 
freest society involves collective oversight and the shaping of social structures so as to 
ensure that they benefit everybody.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Generations of critics have considered Hegel an authoritarian thinker, particularly on the 
basis of his Philosophy of History. Hegel, they argue, proposes that reason imposes itself 
on individuals over the course of history—either as a God-like subject or inexorable 
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force, or in the sense that it is reason, rather than individuals, that determines what form 
of development constitutes progress. Additionally, this rational improvement is one for 
spirit, which is actualized in the form of the state and increases its freedom over the 
course of history. In other words: the legitimacy of a state depends on its freedom and 
rational organization (rather than the wellbeing or approval of its citizens) and historical 
progress from one state to another is measured by a predetermined standard of what is 
rational, which is outlined in Hegel’s metaphysics as he develops it in the Science of 
Logic; some interpreters even take progress to be caused by reason or actualized reason, 
which Hegel calls spirit. 
This criticism of the metaphysical Hegel is almost as old as Hegel’s philosophy 
itself and has been presented in many different versions. Marx worries, for example, that 
Hegel’s logical “idea” is the “true essence”, the “real subject” of the state, with the state’s 
attributes being understood as “logical-metaphysical determinations”.1 Russell claims that, 
for Hegel, “a mystical entity called spirit … causes human history to develop according 
to the stages of dialectic set forth in Hegel’s Logic;”2 additionally, he says, the state is 
“absolute” in relation to its citizens,3 which are there for “its sake” rather than inversely.4 
Habermas proposes that world spirit is the only “subject of history”.5 And since the 
“absolute” or world spirit actualizes itself in a rational state, this entails the “primacy of 
the higher-level subjectivity of the state over the subjective freedom of the individual.”6 
Theunissen proposes that Hegel interprets the social relations as “a relation of the 
substance to itself”,7 whereupon citizens are the accidents of the state substance. 
These interpretations contrast with so-called non-metaphysical readings—and, 
indeed, with the Kant-inspired, formal metaphysics Pippin recently attributed to Hegel.8 
It is fair to say that at least part of the appeal of a non-metaphysical or formally 
metaphysical Hegel derives precisely from the possibility of avoiding the authoritarian, 
anti-individualist implications of his philosophy. As Pippin puts it, “any notion of 
                                                
1 Marx 1956, 216, cf. 312 
2 Russell 2008, 784. 
3 Russell 2008, 741. 
4 Russell 2008, 744. 
5 Habermas 2000, 143. 
6 Habermas 1988, 53.  
7 Theunissen 1982, 328. 
8 Pippin 2019. 
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historical progress look[s] hopeless to most modern philosophers, almost all of whom 
have come to accept a plurality of equally legitimate and incommensurable claims about 
ultimate human ends and goods.”9 This is particularly true, he suggests, for philosophers 
“after the twentieth century”.10 There can be no “prior ethical substantiality”11 (Pippin), 
no “objectively fixed ethical requirements”12 (Moyar) that societies have to display in 
order to be legitimate. Societies do not need to live up to some predetermined and 
ahistorical standard of what a rational or good society is like. A society is legitimate if its 
members judge it to be so by means of the norms that they consider to be rational and 
valid at the time. Otherwise, Pippin insists, individuals and their relation would be 
reduced to mere “epiphenomena” in the self-actualization of reason.13 Brandom therefore 
proposes that “reason’s march through history” must be taken to mean that we can tell 
stories about how we improved our concepts14—and other non-metaphysical Hegelians 
interpret Hegel along similar lines. (Pippin presents a slightly different narrative in his 
recent book on Hegel’s metaphysics entitled Hegel’s Realm of Shadows (2019). Pippin 
argues that Hegel introduces a minimal ahistorical and rational standard in his Logic. 
However, it is an unchanging standard or guideline primarily for answering the formal 
questions of how to make sensible judgments and what constitutes an intelligible act, role 
or institution. It says very little about which roles and institutions are transhistorically 
best, beside the very broad suggestion that legitimate institutions need to be intelligible 
and justify their existence by appeal to reasons rather than force.)15  
While I do not want to deny the merits of non-metaphysical interpretations,16 I 
pursue a different strategy here. I propose that Hegel’s critics are largely right about his 
conception of history, spirit, and its freedom. Hegel is indeed primarily concerned with 
spirit and the actualization of its freedom within a state, in accordance with the rational 
order predetermined in his Logic. (The term “state” refers to the entirety of society 
                                                
9 Pippin 2008, 66.  
10 Pippin 2008, 66. 
11 Pippin 2000, 165. 
12Moyar 2011, 15. 
13 Pippin 2000,165. 
14 Brandom 2009, 91. 
15 For more on this see Baumann 2020. 
16 For a critique of non-metaphysical interpretations, see Beiser 1995, 1–13; Gardner 2007, 19–49. 
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including what Hegel calls the “political state”,17 i.e. state institutions). However, critics 
misinterpret the results that Hegel arrives at from his admittedly anti-individualist starting 
point and they are therefore mistaken on their own terms, i.e. within the framework of the 
traditional metaphysical reading of Hegel. When studied in detail, Hegel’s discussion 
shows that the freedom of the state or spirit systematically requires the freedom of 
individuals. The most rational structure discussed in his Logic, when actualized in a 
society, is an organic, mutually beneficial coordination of group interests involving 
collective oversight of social relations. Individuals collectively shape their respective 
social roles and the structure of their interactions, ensuring that all interests are 
considered and all groups benefit to a similar extent. Such a society thereby allows for a 
meaningful form of individual and collective self-determination.  
There are of course others who read Hegel as non-authoritarian without proposing 
a non-metaphysical interpretation. However, to my knowledge, this article is the first to 
systematically take up problems raised by historical critics of Hegel, defend their key 
tenets and yet show that the authoritarian charge is mistaken, even regarding his most 
controversial work.18 Wood proposed in 1990 that “speculative logic is dead, but Hegel’s 
thought is not”;19 one therefore ought not assume “(with Hegel) that Hegel’s social 
thought is grounded in Hegelian metaphysics”.20 Honneth famously argued in 2000 that 
there are two ways to treat Hegel: One can try to “reactualize Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” 
(or, in fact, any part of his social philosophy) “in accordance with its own methodological 
standards,” by “rehabilitating Hegel’s concept of the state” and his “ontological concept 
of spirit” and by following “the operating instructions of the Logic”. Alternatively, one 
can reactualize Hegel while ignoring those problematic aspects, since they have 
contributed to the “increasing insignificance” of Hegel’s philosophy.21 Honneth chose the 
second option—rather than the first, which I am pursuing here. Neuhouser wrote in the 
                                                
17 PR §273, §267.  
18 For interesting discussions of Hegel’s conception of history (and its logic), see for example Bubbio 2017 
and Lumsden, forthcoming. There are several discussions of the link between Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
and (parts of) his Logic that do not consider the claims of Hegel’s critics. See for example, Henrich 1982, 
428–250; Vieweg 2012. I agree with Buchwalter that a logical/ metaphysical reading of Hegel remains 
relevant today, particularly regarding the need for a “shared deliberation on common ends.” Buchwalter 
2016, 85. See also Section 3.5 below. 
19 Wood 1990, 4. 
20 Wood 1990, 6. 
21 Honneth 2000, 18; the reference to the “ontological concept of spirit” is on page 17. 
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same year that he would “refrain from defending Hegel’s social theory by attempting to 
make plausible the metaphysics from which it derives”22—even though, he admitted, it is 
a project “worthy of attempting”, since “in my view it has not yet been satisfactorily 
carried out”.23 While not everybody followed this trend,24 it is fair to say that Wood, 
Honneth and Neuhouser captured a general mood among interpreters at the time who 
assumed that one should defend Hegel’s theory either by ignoring (the exact role Hegel 
intended for) his metaphysics or, alternatively, re-interpreting him in a non-metaphysical 
manner. 
 Now, however, Hegel’s metaphysics is receiving renewed attention. Stern, 
Yeomans, Bowman and Kreines are among the interpreters proposing new metaphysical 
interpretations of Hegel.25 But they either do not discuss possible implications for Hegel’s 
social philosophy, or deny the importance of concepts that have traditionally been 
considered the problematic core of Hegel’s metaphysics (like the notion of the absolute 
and that of an ahistorical reason that underlies social and physical reality). Less recent 
metaphysical interpretations by Taylor, Beiser, Westphal and Houlgate26 do not address 
the reasons why core concepts of Hegel’s metaphysics were considered problematic and 
if, why, and to what extent the traditional interpretation of those concepts is mistaken.   
It is therefore time to return to the long-standing question of Hegel’s alleged 
authoritarianism and I will do so in the following steps. In the next section (2), I provide a 
few pointers as to what it means to interpret Hegel metaphysically and why a 
metaphysical Hegel is problematic. Section 3 introduces Hegel’s concepts of spirit and 
history and section 4 examines Hegel’s discussion of different historical states. The 
names “Chinese”, “Greek”, and “Roman” are read as denominations for models of state, 
which draw upon common prejudices about those nations in Hegel’s time. Hodgson 
fittingly calls this a “typology” of societies”.27 Hegel considers some ways of organizing 
society more rational than others—and I am analyzing how this improved rationality 
bears upon the freedom and wellbeing of the members of society. 
                                                
22 Neuhouser 2000, 134. 
23 Neuhouser 2000, 2. 
24 See, for example, the scholars mentioned at the end of the next paragraph. 
25 See Stern 2009; Yeomans 2011; Yeomans 2015; Bowman 2013; Kreines 2015. 
26 Taylor 1975; Beiser 2005; Westphal 2003; Houlgate 2005; Houlgate 2006. 
27 Hodgson 2012, 92. 
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Before starting my discussion, it is worth briefly addressing the question of 
whether my approach contradicts what Beiser has called “Hegel’s historicism”.28 Beiser 
is right to highlight Hegel’s claim that “philosophy is its own age comprehended in 
thought”.29 However, this does not imply a historicism in any usual sense, nor does it 
exclude a metaphysical reading of Hegel. For Hegel, (his own) philosophy cannot start 
with axioms and derive assumptions; rather, true philosophy “observes” society, history, 
and the world in general – in order to see how spirit or the absolute actualizes itself 
therein. As Stolzenberg rightly notes, Hegel stands in the tradition of Fichte and 
Schelling, who “identify ontology with the metaphysics of self-consciousness”,30 i.e. 
those who propose a metaphysics of an absolute subject. Hegel’s basic point (against 
Fichte and others) is a methodological one: if you start with a principle or proposition 
about an absolute subject, this very methodology contradicts the claim you are making. 
The fact that it is a proposition by a philosopher contradicts the idea that the subject is 
supposed to be absolute and self-grounding (and hence, not dependent on someone called 
Fichte or Hegel who posits or proposes it); and the fact that this absolute subject is 
described as a principle or axiom means that it is basically a subjective thought, rather 
than an actual reality or force in the world. Hegel tries to avoid these problems by looking 
at the real world and observing the absolute subject therein as it posits or develops itself. 
Each society, including its philosophy, has a particular structure that Hegel searches for 
and then analyzes so as to show that it represents a moment in the development of world 
spirit. This approach, of course, affects the way in which he conceives of the absolute 
subject or spirit, which, as I will show, consists in nothing but a particular way of 
understanding nature and of organizing social relations. 
 
2. HEGEL’S METAPHYSICS AND ITS CRITICS 
 
The underlying assumption of Hegel’s metaphysics is that there is a limited 
number of patterns or structures, outlined in his Logic, which underlie all reality.31 
                                                
28 Beiser 1993. 
29 Beiser 1993, 270. 
30 Stolzenberg 2017, 77. 
31 Hegel presupposes that “reality, be it spiritual or natural reality, is essentially structured by relations of 
form [Formverhältnisse], which are in turn graspable according to the formalities of our thought 
structures.” Iber 2000, 15. The structures underlying the world can be analyzed by means of our logical 
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Everything from a stone or plant to a society has a particular and characteristic structure 
(chemical, biological or social in these instances); the Logic discusses their basic 
structural elements. By way of example, Hegel offers Kepler’s discovery about planetary 
movements:32 The physical movement of planets is elliptical; and yet, an ellipsis is a pure 
rational structure or mathematical form of which Kepler was already aware before 
observing it in nature. In the very same manner, Hegel says, every people and society has 
its “determinate own principle”,33 that is, some characteristic basic structure. Hegel 
proposes that we ordinarily assume that there is reason in nature and its laws (in physical, 
independent nature, rather than the human conception of it); and yet, Hegel laments, the 
same is not accepted for social reality.34 (Westphal is therefore right to say that Hegel’s 
logical “concept” is “an ontological structure, like a law of nature rather than a 
conception”).35  
Scholars who take Hegel’s philosophy to be inherently authoritarian do so for 
three reasons, the first two of which are, in principle, valid: First, Hegel’s notion of 
progress. This will be discussed in the next section, but Adorno is certainly right to say 
that “the sense that history takes as the logic of things, is not the sense of the individual 
destiny.”36 History has a logic of its own for Hegel, namely one in which the structures 
analyzed in the Logic gradually come to exist within social structures. Hence, the rational 
improvements of spirit do not (or at least not necessarily) represent improvements for or 
to individuals.  
Second, as Beiser puts it, “the main aim of Hegel’s philosophy is to know the 
absolute”37 or whole; this desire is part and parcel of his metaphysics. Hegel writes that 
“the logical determinations in general […] may be looked upon as definitions of the 
                                                                                                                                            
thinking⎯not because they stem from us, but inversely because our reason is one among other realms in 
which these structures exist. For this reason, Hegel’s ontological inquiry takes the form of a logic, i.e. a 
science of thought. (See also Bartuschat 2007, particularly page 220.) Horstmann calls Hegel’s position a 
“relation-ontological monism”. He does so to indicate that a totality of relations underlies the physical and 
social world for Hegel, rather than one substance as in Spinoza’s philosophy. See Horstmann1984, 36, 104.  
32 VG, 87/64. 
33 VG, 87/64. 
34 PR, 15/12.  
35 Westphal 2003, 53. 
36 Adorno 2006, 43. 
37 Beiser 1995, 4. 
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absolute.” 38  (The “absolute” is a generic term, which refers to something all-
encompassing as opposed to something “finite” that exists beside others. This said, the 
term absolute can also apply to what contains everything within a specific area or 
constellation—all of nature, for example, or the entirety of a particular society; an 
organism is “absolute” in relation to its organs in this sense). The Logic discusses 
different solutions to the problem of how plurality and unity can coexist, different basic 
ways in which finite elements can belong to a whole or absolute. They can do so in the 
manner in which things belong to Being (i.e. by sharing one fundamental characteristic), 
in the way appearances belong to the absolute Essence which appears in them, like 
accidents belonging to a Substance, organs to an Organism, and so on. (When I spell the 
concepts of Hegel’s Logic in capital letters, I do so to make them easily identifiable, not 
in order to suggest a reference to God). 
In fact, though it is not possible to prove here, Hegel’s entire Logic seems to 
discuss not only basic ways in which finite things can belong to a whole, but also the way 
and extent to which they can be “free” in relation to the whole they belong to; conversely, 
the Logic also analyzes how and to what extent the whole can be “free” in relation to its 
finite elements. “Being with oneself in the other” is Hegel’s famous definition of freedom 
(cf. PR §7). In the first book of the Logic, under the header Being-for-Oneself, Hegel 
proposes that “a relation to oneself” is “infinite self-determining”,39 “freedom”,40 “the 
abstract principle of all self-determining”.41 He then specifies that this self-determining 
must occur in relation to another.42 He goes on to develop throughout his work different 
ways in which finite things can be said to be “with themselves” in other finite things and 
the whole, i.e. how things maintain or develop their particular defining qualities despite 
or by means of their relation to other things and the whole. And, inversely, he discusses 
how the whole or totality is “with itself” in finite things, how and to what extent it defines 
and shapes its own elements.  
                                                
38 E1 §85; cf. WL2 555/829. 
39 WL1, 183/164. 
40 WL1, 192/172. 
41 VLM, 93. 
42 WL1, 183/137. 
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  While this particular interpretation may be novel,43 critics have voiced concern 
that Hegel’s Logic (and his analysis of history) is primarily an account of the absolute, of 
how its coherence and structure improves seemingly by repressing individual 
differences.44 If the development of the Logic is actualized in history, this implies that the 
social whole, the state or “spirit”, comes to be a substance, subject and organism—with 
individuals being its accidents, objects and organs respectively, critics worry. 
Additionally, Hegel’s conception entails that the state or spirit improves its power and 
freedom over the course of history for Hegel—rather than individuals having their power 
and freedom increased. While ‘spirit’ is certainly also a descriptive term (e.g. the ‘spirit 
of a time’), it is also and at first exclusively a rational structure for Hegel that ought to 
come to exist in human relations. Spirit in this sense can only be actualized completely in 
a very specific type of state, whose social structure functions according to patterns Hegel 
analyzes at the end of his Logic.  
 The third reason to repudiate Hegel’s philosophy is based on an overly narrow 
theological interpretation of spirit. Popper is not quite correct when he suggests that 
history is a “logical operation” for Hegel, “the thought process of the absolute spirit or 
world spirit”;45 world spirit is not the “subject of history” (Habermas), a God-like 
“mystical entity” (Russell). When he refers to God as the maker of history, Hegel 
maintains that we must abstract from this religious expression and know that he means 
the logical Idea.46 It is true, as discussed under point one, that historical progress is 
measured by the Logic for Hegel. Additionally, Hegel does indeed believe that his 
notions of spirit is an improved rendition of what Christians call God. But spirit, in the 
sense of a rational and self-consciously organized social order, only comes to exist fully 
over the course of history and, therefore, cannot be its maker. And Hegel is clear that 
human beings can also act against what is rational;47 progress does not happen with 
                                                
43 Scholars like Henrich, Flach and Günther argue that there is one relational topic in the entire Logic and 
they identify the same structure that I interpret as freedom. Henrich calls this structure the “doubling of the 
self-relation of negation.” Henrich 1976, 222. Günther and Flach call it “reflection into oneself and into 
another.” Flach 1995, 73; Günther 1987, ix. Horstmann suggests that the one topic the Logic discusses is 
self-relation that contains “the sublation of otherness”, Horstmann 2003, 196.  
44 Karin de Boer has expounded this systematic criticism in her book: De Boer 2010. 
45 Popper 1957, 47. 
46 VPW, 24. 
47 VR1, 14. 
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absolute necessity. Hegel merely assumes that, due to their superior consistency, societies 
which function according to more coherent logical patterns can be expected to prevail, 
while less coherent societies are inherently unstable and bound to be overcome.48  
 
3. HEGEL’S CONCEPTS OF SPIRIT AND HISTORY  
 
Hegel famously defines history as the “progress of the consciousness of freedom”.49 This 
could mean that progress involves individuals becoming freer and more conscious of 
their freedom. However, Hegel also calls history the “revelation of spirit in reality”,50 
spirit’s “self-production”,51 spirit’s reaching “the knowledge of what it is in itself”:52 
“Reason is immanent to historical existence, actualizes itself in and through it.”53  
These passages suggest that critics are right: history is the history of spirit for 
Hegel; it is the development of “spirit’s freedom”—the freedom of “universal spirit,” 
rather than that of individuals.54 The term spirit is clearly not used in its descriptive sense 
here (e.g. ‘spirit of a time’). Rather, Hegel refers to the “concept of spirit”, which is a 
“possibility, a potentiality”;55 In fact, Hegel treats “self-conscious reason” and “spirit”56 
synonymously. Spirit is a rational structure that ought to come into existence and, as part 
of this process, become self-conscious. This is implied in Hegel’s claim that social 
structures should display the form of the “absolute Idea”,57—that is, the most coherent 
and rational structure, which Hegel analyzes in the Logic. Spirit is a whole or absolute,58 
which displays the form of freedom or “being with oneself”,59 and, as he points out, this 
                                                
48 I agree with Thanassas that there is no end of history for Hegel. Thanassas 2009. The most rational 
structure is dynamic and adapts to new challenges, e.g. new differences and tensions that emerge and need 
to be organized in a coherent manner—and so does a society that displays this form. 
49 VG, 31/19. 
50 PG, 39. 
51 PRV19, 280. 
52 VG, 31/17–18, my translation. 
53 VG, 40. This phrase is missing in the Sibree translation (VG); it would have been on p. 25. 
54 PR, §342. 
55 VG, 36/22. 
56 VG, 23/11. 
57 VPW, 25; cf. VG, 41/26–27. 
58 Hegel says that spirit is not finite, but contains all finitude (E3, §386A). 
59 VG, 30/17, Sibree keeps the German expression “Bei-sich-selbst-seyn”. 
 11 
is the shape of the absolute Idea.60 The absolute Idea is a complex, all-encompassing 
structure that contains all previous logical structures, including the pure forms of 
actualization,61 freedom, and self-consciousness.62 Spirit merely refers to those logical 
forms insofar as they come to exist in the real world.  
Only a state, in the sense of an entire social order including the government and 
the citizens, can actualize the notion of a free, structured and self-conscious whole. This 
is why Hegel writes: “The state is the idea of spirit in the external manifestation of the 
human will and its freedom.”63 “The state is the divine Idea, as it exists on earth.”64 A 
society is self-determining if the government, representing this society, regulates the 
behavior of its citizens; the society gives itself laws that it follows. Hegel’s famous 
formula for freedom is “being with oneself in the other” and a state (i.e. the social whole) 
is with itself in its other (namely, the citizens) insofar as they enact the laws made by the 
government.  
 
4. HISTORICAL TYPES OF STATE 
 
Hegel’s definition of spirit implies that any unified state—whether it is a dictatorship or a 
democracy—is an instance of free spirit, at least in the minimal sense of a society that 
determines its own rules. Hegel defines spirit in this way because he wants to identify the 
best type of state—from an absolute standpoint or by the standards of pure reason. He 
clearly cannot refer to norms that emerged with modernity such as individual freedom or 
equality. For this reason, Hegel begins with the form of statehood as such, which is the 
basic form of spirit, namely a self-determined, centralized, and structured social order. He 
then searches for the social structure that actualizes spirit, and thereby “being with 
oneself in the other” and the form of statehood, most coherently.   
Hegel expects to find the structures discussed in his Logic within the social 
structures of historical states. The simplest logical form Hegel detects in a state is what he 
calls ‘substance’, which he discusses under Actuality. It is no coincidence that history 
starts where spirit becomes “actualized” and that the logical structures that can be present 
                                                
60 VG, 42/27. 
61 WL2, 186–240/541–553. 
62 WL2, 487/775. 
63 VG, 66/47. 
64 VG, 57/39. 
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in a state start with Actuality. A social order with the form of Being would be a mere 
abstraction, the theoretical claim that individuals, who are unconnected atoms spread out 
in nature, are nevertheless instances of one and the same, atoms of humanity. A social 
order in the form of Essence would be the hidden common principle of all individuals, 
which each individual enacts differently. Hegel’s argument in Actuality is that the 
absolute must be “actual”, that is to say, a unity that is visible in the characters of and 
relations between things or, indeed, individuals. This is a minimal requirement for a 
social order. 
 
3.1. The Elements of Statehood: Unity and Difference 
 
Hegel’s account starts with Ancient China and India, which represent opposite elements 
of statehood for Hegel: “China and India lie, as it were, still outside the world’s history, 
as the mere presupposition of elements whose combination must be waited for to 
constitute their vital progress.”65 Under the label “Ancient China”, Hegel discusses the 
element of unity, which dominates the other element of statehood, namely difference and 
the diversity of groups and individuals. In India, by contrast, “difference becomes pre-
eminent”,66 different ethnicities, regions, languages, traditions and religions. Since Hegel 
India has “no state”67 or effective centralized rule for Hegel,68 this society will be left out 
of the present analysis.  
 
3.2. China: The Substantialist State 
 
Hegel’s China is thoroughly centralized: All human relations—including family 
relations69—are legally ordained,70 and the emperor regulates all matters (like literature, 
historiography, poetry, and the sciences).71 Morality is regulated and punished in the 
                                                
65 VG, 147/116. 
66 VG, 180/144. 
67 VG, 201/161. 
68 Cf. VG, 192/153. 
69 VG, 153–154/121. 
70 VG, 161/128. 
71 PG, 81–82 
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same way as crime.72 All land is owned by the state;73 the emperor is head of the state 
religion74 and even God.75 Everyone except the emperor counts as legally immature76 and 
does nothing but enact decrees made by the emperor. As Hegel says, the “universal will 
acts directly by means of the individual.”77   
Interestingly, Hegel does not consider this a necessarily unhappy condition. It is 
true that the “wellbeing of citizens, the establishment of a lawful condition, all depends 
on the character of the emperor,” 78 but, according to Hegel, “many excellent emperors 
have ruled in China.”79 In fact, Hegel supposes that neither the emperor nor the citizens 
have consciousness of their own individual selves or interests: “The moral will of the 
emperor is law,” 80 that is, whatever he considers morally best. The emperor may be 
mistaken, but he acts with “fatherly care”,81 aiming at the good of his subjects. Chinese 
citizens, for their part, “obey selflessly and without reflection”.82 “The individual does 
not know his own identity as against the substance [i.e. the state], which is not yet a 
power standing over against him.”83  
Hegel’s analysis of this type of state revolves around the concept of substance. He 
proposes: “[T]he substance is immediately one subject, the emperor.”84 “Individuals 
appear only as accidents.”85 One entity or substance permeates everything in Hegel’s 
China, including the behavior and minds of individuals. This substance is the state, which 
is personified in the emperor’s will. Hegel clearly has Spinoza’s substance in mind, as he 
compares China to “Spinozism, which takes what is individual to be null and retains only 
                                                
72 VG, 208/166. 
73 VG, 164/130; VPW, 142. 
74 VG, 166/131. 
75 PR, §355. 
76 VG, 161/128. 
77 VG, 152/120, my translation. 
78 PG, 84. 
79 PG, 84. 
80 VG, 201/160; PG, 72. 
81 VG, 153/121, my translation. 
82 VG, 152/120, my translation. 
83 VG, 152/120, my translation. 
84 VG, 152/120, my translation. 
85 PG, 72. 
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the abstract substance therein.”86  
Spinoza’s substance87 actualizes itself in finite things, as Hegel puts it in his 
Logic, by making them “the expression or image of the absolute”.88 The term expression 
is misleading, however, and it would be more correct to say that things count as nothing 
but the substance itself. An expression exists outside the one who expresses herself; the 
expression is made on some external material and does not automatically change when 
she changes her mind. Things in relation to the substance are rather like glass in relation 
to light, that is, completely transparent: “There is nothing in the finite which could 
preserve for it a distinction against the absolute; it is a medium which is absorbed by that 
which shines through it.”89  
Hegel makes precisely this point about China:90 
 
In the Orient […] only the one substance as such is the truth and the individual has no 
worth in him and cannot win, insofar as he maintains himself as against the in-and-for-
itself; he can rather only have true value through making himself one with the 
substance, by means of which he stops existing as a subject, disappears into 
unconsciousness.91 
 
If this is Hegel’s take on Ancient China, then one might ask: what is wrong with this 
form of organizing society? If we read Hegel as a substantialist, he should be very 
pleased with this social order. In fact, the Chinese state, as Hegel conceives of it, is 
almost exactly the state that Berlin and Popper believe he advocates: the state is a well-
intentioned order. There is certainly the “blind obedience” that Popper sees Hegel as 
proposing,92 and one can even say that individuals are free by obeying the emperor in the 
very sense Popper and Berlin attribute to Hegel.93 Hegel calls it “substantial, objective 
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freedom”94 and explains in the Logic: “When Spinoza proceeds to human spirit, he posits 
the determination that it liberates itself from bondage and this is the affects […] Human 
freedom consists in the love of God, i.e. the direction of spirit to the substance; 
everything particular consumes itself.”95 Hegel is proposing that, according to Spinoza, 
human beings are free in that they identify with the one substance—just as citizens of a 
substantialist state completely accept the emperor’s rule. They are thereby liberated from 
the rule of their emotions and desires, i.e. their “affects”. Individuals are free insofar as 
they act on the basis of thought, even moral thinking, even if this thinking is, admittedly, 
not their own. 
But Hegel disapproves of the substantialist state as much as he disapproves of 
substance. After the above-quoted passage on freedom in Spinoza, Hegel remarks: “You 
need to proceed from the substance to the subject, within which the human being is free. 
What is outrageous is the determination of Spinoza’s substance that man shall see himself 
only as an accident.”96  
The subject to which Hegel refers is clearly not the individual, but the absolute 
(which was previously defined as a substance). Hegel refers to his famous demand that 
the absolute must be not only a substance, but also a subject (which he first mentions in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit and then discusses in detail at the end of the second book of 
his Logic). Hegel suggests in the quoted passage that if the absolute is also a subject 
rather than only a substance, individual freedom increases. He suggests the same of 
China, saying that the substance does not attain to “reflection into itself, subjectivity”,97 
linking this missing subjectivity of the state to a lack of individual freedom.98 At this 
point, this suggestion is surprising, since it would seem irrelevant to individuals whether 
they are ruled over by a subject or a substance. The proposition will only become clear 
once one reaches his account of the modern European state, which he describes as an 
absolute subject. 
What is clear, however, is that Hegel does not reject China or Substance on the 
basis of individual freedom or the concept of subjectivity. In fact, Hegel never applies 
standards that emerge later in his system or in subsequent historical epochs to previous 
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structures and societies. The problem he highlights is internal to Substance and to the 
substantialist state. Hegel’s critique of Spinoza’s substance is that it is “the universal 
might of negation”;99 the claim that there is just one absolute substance merely consists in 
denying the apparent differences and independent existence of finite things. Since the 
differences between things are merely denied or “negated”, they remain outside the 
definition of substance—and substance is not absolute or all-encompassing after all. 
What this means becomes very clear in Hegel’s analysis of the substantialist state. 
Hegel writes: “[T]he law of freedom rules individuals only from without.”100 “The ethical 
determinations are pronounced as laws, but in such a way, that the subjective will is 
governed by those laws as an external force.”101 The good Chinese laws are only 
externally applied to individuals. This statement presupposes that there is something 
internal to individuals that the laws miss. Human beings cannot become glass-like, 
transparently transposing the orders of the emperor into actions. They cannot simply be 
an extension of the emperor’s will. Even if individuals have neither a particular social 
status nor a conscious individual will, they at least have some natural desires, drives, 
needs, and feelings. This individuality of citizens is excluded from the Chinese state.  
The substantialist state appears to be perfectly free or “with itself in its other”, 
self-related in its citizens, since they are nothing but the tools of the state’s will. 
However, the state is only present in the externally coerced actions of individuals, and not 
in the thoughts, characters, and relations they establish of their own accord. The true 
other within which the state would need to exist remains outside the reach of state power, 
limiting it and threatening its existence: “When the surveillance from above decreases, 
there is no principle that could urge civil servants to respect legality.”102 When the 
government becomes more lenient, disturbances necessarily occur.103 
Hegel is not saying that it is wrong to make individuals blindly obey a ruler; he 
neither invokes modern achievements like human rights, nor, indeed, does his criticism 
focus on the condition of individuals. Rather, he argues that a society that functions like a 
substance is inherently flawed and unstable, and cannot last. There always remains some 
residual individuality, something that makes it impossible for human beings to become 
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the unconscious limbs of the emperor, even if they wanted to. 
 
3.3. The Greek Polis: The Beautiful or Organicist State 
 
The Greek polis unites the two elements of statehood for Hegel and is therefore the first 
state proper. The polis does not turn citizens into mere tools of the unified state (as in 
China), nor do individuals or groups insist on their independence to the extent that any 
unified rule becomes impossible (as in India). Rather, independent individuals freely 
decide to follow the same laws, which they all make together.  
While the Chinese state appeared to function like one absolute substance, Hegel’s 
critical analysis showed that human beings and the state were more like two substances 
conditioning one another. As Hegel explains in his Logic, the active substance (here: the 
Chinese emperor) depends on there being a “passive substance”104 or people to act upon. 
This external conditioning is overcome when society and individuals become, in the 
words of Hegel’s Logic, “one and the same content”,105 and only display a “difference of 
form”.106 In the pre-history of the polis, Hegel claims, individuals and the state come to 
contain elements of the respective other: Individuals become thinking beings,107 who can 
(and do)108 freely decide to follow universal laws, and the social whole turns into 
something humanized and man-made in the minds of individuals. The Chinese emperor 
was God imposing his will; Greeks still consider their society as a Goddess (Athene), but 
Athena, Zeus, 109  the muses, and the other gods represent human, spiritual 
achievements.110 As a result, Hegel says, “[t]he divine receives its honors mediated by the 
honor of the human and the human mediated by the honor of the divine.”111 Ancient 
Greeks know themselves as “creators” and what they create as “human creation,” and yet 
also as “eternal truths and the powers of spirit in and for itself.”112  
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The polis, once established, is a direct democracy for Hegel:  
 
He [the citizen] must be present at the main negotiations, participate in the decision-
making as such, and not merely by means of his vote, but he must mingle in the heat of 
the action⎯the passion and interest of the whole man being absorbed in the affair […] 
This unity of opinion to which the whole community must be brought, must be 
produced in the individual members, heating them by means of oration.113 
 
Hegel thus proposes that Ancient Greeks (or more precisely Athenians) decide by 
consensus, and that individual wills and the political rule completely coincide in the polis. 
But how can free and thinking beings reach a consensus on all matters? Hegel offers two 
explanations. First, Greek individuals do not have any particular interests;114 all they want 
is to enact and further “the law, the affairs of the state”.115 “In this [Greek freedom] the 
individual will in all its vitality is free and in its particularity the acting out of the 
substantial.”116 Greek citizens freely use their particular talents and ideas for the common 
good.117 Second, Hegel supposes that Athenians before Socrates do not look for general 
principles of what is right and good, and therefore do not judge the state according to 
such principles. Greeks live “a life for religion, for the state, without further reflection 
and without analysis leading to abstract definitions, which must lead away from the 
concrete embodiment of them”.118 Greeks only want the specific constitution, leaders, 
decisions, and social practices as they exist or are decided upon communally at present.  
Chytry is right to say that Hegel develops a “romantic aesthetic-organicistic”119 
conception of the Greek polis. In fact, the polis displays broad characteristics of the 
logical structure Hegel calls the Concept, which is often explained by taking the organism 
or “free love”120 as an example. The polis does not yet display the modern element of a 
differentiation into organs or different harmoniously interrelated groups; however, it is a 
beautiful, harmonious, natural interrelation, rather than a mechanical, forceful, calculated 
                                                
113 VG, 312/255, my translation. 
114 VG, 308/252. 
115 VG, 308./251, my translation. 
116 VG, 307/251, my translation. 
117 Cf. VG, 318/260. 
118 VG, 327/267–268. 
119 Chytry 1989, 142. 
120 WL2, 277/603. 
 19 
order. And it is clearly a “unity in difference” in the sense of the Concept: Lovers and the 
love-relation, organism and the organs, the Greek polis and its members are 
distinguishable; yet they are also “one and the same content” in a different form. Love is 
nothing but the relation of the two lovers, the organism is nothing but the relation 
between the organs, and the polis and its laws are nothing but the Greek citizens, their 
shared views, relations and decisions. For this reason, just as Hegel says of the Concept, 
the Greek polis does not “violently” subsume its other,121 forcing individuals under its 
laws.  
Nevertheless, the polis is not an ideal society for Hegel. He writes: 
 
This Greek ethical life … nevertheless, fails to be the highest standpoint of spiritual 
self-consciousness; the infinite form is missing, just this reflection of thinking into itself 
… the infinity of self-consciousness, that, what shall be valid for me as right and 
ethicality, is confirmed in me, by means of the testimony of my spirit.122  
 
The polis lacks “the infinite form,” “reflection,” or “self-consciousness.” Part of what 
Hegel means is captured by Wood, when he says: “[m]en share the same norms, 
institutions, gods and cultic activities, and cannot raise the questions why they do so or 
whether they should do so.”123 However, Hegel says in another passage that “[t]he 
infinite form of subjectivity must be built into the state”.124 Hegel is thus suggesting that 
both the polis and its citizens lack subjectivity. Self-conscious reflection requires, as a 
first step, that subject and object of consciousness be distinguished, which can then be 
identified in the second step. The laws or law-makers should be distinguishable from 
social reality or individuals and their behavior—so that both can be the subject or object 
of thought, consciously analyzing the respective other. In his Logic, Hegel argues that an 
organic whole needs to “distinguish itself from itself”125 to become a self-conscious 
subject.  
Hegel’s reasoning in the Logic is that the harmoniously structured whole can only 
be maintained if there is some “reflection” or feedback mechanism through which it is 
possible to check whether the order remains harmonious and organic, and if necessary to 
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improve it. Only thus can the organism consciously “maintain itself”. This is precisely 
Hegel’s worry about the polis: it is purely accidental whether the polis remains a 
harmonious social order. Neither the order as such nor the specific content of public 
decisions can be critically evaluated. Greeks “did not decide through themselves, but they 
took the decision from something else”.126 “To decide out of oneself you require a fixed 
subjectivity of the will, that is determined by preponderant reasons; the Greeks did not 
yet have this power and strength of the will.”127 The oracle,128 the opinion of a good 
orator,129 or an accidental twist of the discussion provides the Greeks with the content of 
their decisions, rather than their rational judgments.130  
While the substantialist state fails to sufficiently involve citizens’ wills, members 
of an organicist state are too involved in state affairs; in fact, the state is nothing but their 
wills and the structures created by their past decisions. While human relations are free 
and harmonious, they arise naturally, in an accidental fashion, without any guidelines, 
critical reflection or decisions based on reasons. 
 
3.4. The Roman Empire: The External State 
 
Hegel credits the Roman state with introducing a split between subjectivity and 
objectivity—thereby providing the foundation not only for the subjectivity of individuals, 
but also for a self-conscious collective subjectivity, which is the form of the modern state. 
Hegel writes: “The Romans then accomplished this important separation and discovered a 
principle of law which is external, i.e. separate from conviction and sentiment.”131 It is an 
important insight for Hegel that laws and institutions do not (necessarily) coincide with 
the wills, wellbeing, and interests of those to whom the laws are applied. Yet it also 
makes for a very harsh social order. Hegel envisions Ancient Rome as a society in 
which rulers and ruled are only concerned with themselves: Individuals are private 
persons132 who only want their own private freedom and/or regard all external reality as 
                                                
126 VG, 311/254, my translation. 
127 VG, 310/254, my translation. 
128 VG, 306/250. 
129 VG, 311/254. 
130 PR, §279. 
131 VG, 351/289. 
132 Cf. VG, 339/278. 
 21 
null (as in the case of the stoic). Patricians rule according to their own particular 
interest;133 the emperor rules by his arbitrary will.134 The Roman state is an unpredictable, 
alien power that commands “self-sacrifice to the grand object of the union”,135 complete 
“subordination”.136 
 The Roman Empire displays the basic form of what Hegel calls “external 
teleology”137 in his Logic: Like the “independent objects”138 discussed in this part of the 
Logic, Roman individuals freely define themselves while also being completely subject to 
external laws.139 Hegel compares those laws to “fate”140 in the Logic and in his discussion 
of Rome. Roman rulers use their power “for their own ends and against the people”;141 
the government is blind to the people’s needs and its decisions are inexorable as destiny.  
Similarly as in the Logic,142 Hegel suggests that it is because individuals are purely self-
interested that they are ruled over forcefully: The invention of the private person 
“involved the decay of political life […] A middle ground was missing between the 
emperor and the governed”. 143  The egotism enshrined in private law entails that 
individuals do not express political interests on the basis of which they could negotiate 
with those in power. Because legal persons are separate, atom-like units, any unity 
between them is externally imposed,144 rather than growing out of their own interrelation. 
Hegel even describes the emperor as the “person of persons, entitled to possess all 
persons”,145 suggesting that independent property-owners can only be united by denying 
their independence and disrespecting their property. 
Hegel does not spend much time showing why such a forceful and inhumane 
condition cannot be maintained indefinitely; he believes this to be self-evident. He 
                                                
133 VG, 340/279, 358/294. 
134 VPW, 417. 
135 VG, 345/284. 
136 VG, 346/284. 
137 VG, 358/294. 
138 WL2, 409/711. 
139 Cf. E1, §194; VG, 340/279. 
140 WL2, 421/720; VG, 339/278; VPW, 393. 
141 VG, 358/294, my translation. 
142 WL2, 421/720. 
143 VG, 384/317, my translation. 
144 VG, 351/288. 
145 VG, 387/320, my translation. 
 22 
instead argues that, after the first innocent and unreflective identification with the social 
world is left behind (with the Greek polis), it is nevertheless possible for society and 
individuals to be in harmony. In Stoicism, individuals come to know their own internal 
thinking and subjectivity; early Christians then entertain the hope that there is something 
within their own spirits that makes them equal to God and allows for a harmonious fit 
with God’s creation.146  
 
3.5. Modern Europe: The State as a Self-conscious Collective Subject 
 
Unlike in previous sections, Hegel does not pretend to describe one specific nation in the 
last chapter. Nor, indeed, does he spend much time on the type of state he considers to be 
European, since he explicated it in his Philosophy of Right.147 Rather, Hegel discusses 
“the Germanic world”, which he identifies with major parts of Europe148 and he primarily 
expounds the “Germanic principles”,149 which are present (to some extent) in all bigger 
European states for Hegel. The Reformation and the French Revolution represent two 
principles or opposite ways of overcoming the split between subjectivity and objectivity, 
individuals and society. When integrated, these principles constitute the European form 
of state that involves a collective subjectivity.  
The Reformation (and, in fact, the Enlightenment) enables individuals to identify 
with the world by means of their own belief or reasoning: “Nature is now a system of 
known and recognized laws, man is at home therein […] he is free in the cognition of 
nature.”150 Enlightened individuals are free in nature, insofar as they recognize their own 
reason in its laws. For Protestants, the state is rational and an expression of the Holy 
Spirit, which is identical to their own reason. Hegel says the Protestant worldview 
involves “[o]bedience to the state laws as to reason […] In this obedience, man thus 
pertains only to his universal being, which is his own rationality.”151 In both cases, 
freedom merely involves interpreting the world as being identical to oneself. The French 
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Revolution, on the contrary, demands that the free will create a new reality of its 
choosing. “The principle of the freedom of the will has asserted itself as against the 
existing law.”152 “Thinking […] is the activity and production of the universal.”153 
Hegel argues in his Logic that the most coherent and free whole is an organism 
that is also a self-cognizing and self-willing subject. Hegel introduces two ways of 
overcoming the separation between subjectivity and objectivity,154 which he calls the 
Ideas of Cognition and Volition, or the theoretical and the practical Idea. Cognition is 
“the accommodation of the existing world into oneself, into subjective representing and 
thinking”, while Volition consists in “conversely, sublating the one-sidedness of the 
world […] determining this world through the inwardness of the subject”.155 Hegel 
clearly understands the Reformation and the French Revolution in this way, and points 
out that the Germans are “theoretical,” while the French are “practical”156 ⎯echoing the 
distinction between the theoretical and practical Idea. 
Cognition and Volition, when taken individually, fail to overcome the split 
between objectivity and subjectivity. In Cognition, the subject identifies with a “reality 
that exists independently of the subjective positing”;157 also in Luther’s Reformation, the 
“content” of the truth is “something given, something revealed by religion”.158 While 
Cognition merely turns objectivity into an accepted objectivity rather than something 
produced by the subject, Volition never attains the recognition that the will has been 
actualized: “Hence it is only the will itself that stands in the way of the attainment of its 
goal, for it separates itself from cognition, and external reality for the will does not 
receive the form of a true being.”159 Hegel’s famous criticism of the French Revolution is 
that it is purely destructive, constantly imposing something new.160  
It is worth pausing at this point. Critics have expressed concern about Hegel’s 
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conception of a state-subject.161 The central worry is that the state-subject and its will or 
structure is something pre-given and distinct from individuals, their wills, decisions and 
interests. The state’s subjectivity is taken to imply that the state institutions actualize the 
logical structures Hegel calls subjectivity or self-consciousness or, simply, the king’s 
personal view of the common good. Habermas worries, in this vein, that the state is 
distinct from society and the wills of individuals, who are, as he says citing Henrich, 
“completely absorbed into the order of institutions” and only “justified” and valuable if 
and insofar as they carry out the state’s functions.162 Horstmann suggests something 
similar when he proposes that individuals are theoretically, rather than practically free.163 
They are only free insofar as they identify with the state, recognize its structure as that of 
subjectivity and consider its freedom as theirs. They are not practically free in the state, 
not self-related in its laws, as they are not actually the rulers of the state.  
The discussion so far has already, partly, addressed this worry: Hegel’s account of 
the European principles makes clear that Hegel’s state-subject must be a collective 
subject: Hegel introduces the moments of cognition and willing that constitute such a 
subject as collective attitudes, the sciences, and activities of human beings. The absolute 
subjectivity of the state requires that human beings create their world, rather than some 
benevolent government or a God-like force doing so. As Hegel outlines in his Logic, the 
absolute subject needs to know what it wants, for only then can Cognition and Volition 
be united to form what Hegel calls the absolute Idea.164 The absolute “Idea posit[s] itself 
eternally as purpose and bring[s] forth its actuality through its activity”.165 “The logical 
Idea has itself as the infinite form for its content.”166 In his Philosophy of History, Hegel 
writes: “The Germanic spirit is the spirit of the new world, whose aim is the actualization 
of […] the infinite self-determination of freedom, that freedom, which has its own 
absolute form itself as a content.”167 Leaving aside the question of what constitutes the 
form of freedom or absolute form, Hegel’s basic line of reasoning is quite clear: 
Cognition has something else as its content, the given external reality. Volition proposes 
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that reality ought to be nothing but what the will wants and brings about; the problem is 
that the will does not know what to want. Only if the will wants its own form or structure 
is there something specific that is wanted, which the will can recognize when it is 
actualized in social reality. I will come back to the question of what exactly the will 
wants, namely, its form or the form of freedom. For now it is clear that the best society 
involves individuals (collectively or rather by means of a representative institution) 
shaping and overseeing their own interactions so as to ensure that they display and 
continue to display the most rational structure (which is also the form of freedom and, 
hence, also that of the free will).  
What does the most rational society look like? Just as the absolute Idea contains 
all valuable elements of all previous logical structures, so does the state as collective 
subject incorporate the valuable elements of all other historical states for Hegel (and, 
indeed, European history repeats world history): The monarch represents the unity of the 
state (similarly to the Chinese emperor). Rather than a modern parliament, Hegel 
proposes an assembly of estates, in which professional groups coordinate their interests 
and make laws on that basis. The organic and mutually beneficial interrelation of 
professional groups and classes takes up aspects of the organic Greek polis. The Roman 
reflective distance between individual and society is preserved in civil society and market 
relations.  
The new and European achievement, in Hegel’s eyes, is the subjectivity of the 
state itself. Absolute subjectivity requires that subject and object are identical; otherwise 
the subject merely tries to impose its aims on something that always remains external to 
those aims (this is the gist of Hegel’s criticism of external Teleology in the Logic). Both 
the organism and the organs function as object and subject respectively. This means that 
separate groups or individuals as subjects analyze and make demands on the state (as 
their object); and, inversely, collective individuals in the estates assembly make the 
behavior and interrelations of separate groupings and individuals the object of their 
discussion, lawmaking, and intervention.  
But what exactly makes this the most rational type of state, the one that actualizes 
the “absolute form” and the “form of freedom”? “Absolute form” is a term from Hegel’s 
Logic;168 it describes the Idea as a structure that contains all content—and knows that it 
does so. This may sound dangerously totalitarian, like a state that controls all aspects of 
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life. However, what Hegel is getting at is a structure that can accommodate all differences 
and organize them into a harmonious, stable, and mutually supportive whole. On Hegel’s 
account, the modern state he describes is the best and most rational one, as it organizes 
diverging (economic) interests, ways of life, and diverse aspects of individuals (like their 
rationality and irrationality,169 desires, need for privacy, and social recognition) in a 
rational, i.e. a harmonious and consistent, manner. 
This is also why this social order actualizes the “form of freedom” or “being with 
oneself in the other”. As cited in section 3, Hegel says that the concept of spirit is fully 
actualized when a social structure displays the formula “being with oneself in the other” 
in the form of the absolute Idea.170 Freedom requires that the other affirms me and 
enables me to be who I am or to become who I want to be, while I conversely affirm him 
or her. For a human being, the “other” is not only other human beings; it is also, in 
principle, nature and, more importantly, the social system as a whole.  
Hegel assumes that the social system he describes allows for the highest degree of 
freedom— for individuals and, indeed, for the state. Put simply, the state is free and 
actualized insofar as it is inclusive and there remains nothing of individuals outside the 
state which would limit and threaten its existence. (Human) nature and the irrationality 
and desires of individuals are given their place within a social order; it determines itself 
by structuring even those aspects of human beings and their surroundings.  
Hegel believes that this social order is also the freest for individuals, more so than 
a representative democracy, with the “unorganic […] mode of voting”,171 which is based 
on “mere numbers”, 172  rather than differences of interests and their harmonious 
organization.173 When voting, one influences the outcome of the election minimally and 
the plurality of diverse interests cannot be represented in large parties. Hegel assumes 
that, in any social interaction, there are patterns, roles, and different interests; hence, 
freedom requires that economic groups negotiate their positions within the assembly of 
estates. In that manner, human beings can shape the social roles and professions they 
inhabit and it is ensured that all interest groups benefit to a similar degree. (Additionally, 
there are other aspects of individuals, such as their desires, consumer choices, private 
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actions and convictions, which do not impinge directly on the interests of others and that 
must merely be given the proper space and protection.) 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
A key concern about Hegel’s Philosophy of History is that its author regards individuals 
as mere means for a given end, namely spirit’s existence. While this take on Hegel’s 
conception of history is not in itself mistaken, Hegel’s central argument is that spirit 
cannot be actualized by imposing a predetermined structure on individuals. Human 
beings, the supposed matter of spirit’s actualization, present a certain resistance to being 
this matter. The structure of spirit must accommodate this fact—and this is precisely its 
rationality. Spirit is not a force or person; it is a structure, and this structure is rational to 
the degree that it structures and unites different groups, individuals and aspects of human 
beings in a coherent and stable manner. As Hegel argues in his Logic, the unity, structure, 
or form must pick up on the matter’s own form; the social structure must incorporate the 
thoughts, characteristics, and diverse interests of individuals, otherwise it remains 
deficient and unstable. 
The metaphysical Hegel certainly does not make the rationality of a social 
structure dependent upon individuals’ opinions and judgments, as non-metaphysical 
Hegelians demand. For him, the best state and most complete freedom requires that 
society display a specific structure that pure reason has shown to be the most rational one. 
However, this structure involves the re-appropriation of social structures by individuals 
and, therefore, their power to actively and collectively shape their own world. It is true 
that the freedom of the state is what actualizes free spirit. However, the state’s freedom 
systematically requires that of individuals. Or more precisely: In the most coherent social 
order, the state’s freedom is nothing but the coordination of diverging interests and the 
collective oversight over social relations. For Hegel, society and individual wills need to 
be in harmony, not by making all individuals will nothing but the social good (as in 
Greece), but by institutionalizing their discussion and negotiation of interests as part of 
the social system.  
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